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ABSTRACT: Cost overruns are almost as massive and almost as pervasive on
private "first of a kind" projects as on defense contracts. This paper
examines the cost overrun problem in terms of the methodology of cost
estimation, abstracting from moral hazard problems. The main results of 
the paper are these: first, if cost estimators are an unbiased estimation
methodology, then under certain monotonicity conditions, this will produce 
an observed cost underestimation bias , because cost estimates are used as a 
guide to project decis ion making; second, the more uncertainty there is with 
respect to the costs of a project, the larger will be the observed cost 
underestimation bias, assuming the estimator uses an unbiased estimation 
methodology; third, in bottoms up estimation , the most accurate of cost 
estimation methodologies, there is a built in cost underestimation bias 
because the value of information is not incorporated into the cost estimate; 
fourth , the size of the underestimation bias in bottoms up estimation 
definitely- increases with uncertainty only under rather stringent conditions 
on the construction production function . 
THE WINNER'S CURSE AND 
COST ESTIMATION BIAS IN PIONEER PROJECTS* 
James Quirk 
California Institute of Technology 
Katsuaki Terasawa 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
I. Introduction 
The recent growth of the defense budget has been accompanied 
by a heightened public awareness of the existence of massive cost 
overruns in defense procurement. The literature of defense economics 
has tended to center in on the lack of adequate incentives to keep 
defense contracting costs under control, given the frequent use of 
sole source contracts coupled with cost plus a fixed fee or 
renegotiable fixed price financing arrangements (see Cummins (1977) , 
Weitzman (1980) , Peck and Scherer (1962) , and Terasawa. Quirk and 
Womar (1983) ) .  What has received less attention is the by now well 
documented fact that cost overruns are almost as pervasive and almost 
as massive in many recent privately financed construction projects, 
particularly "pioneer" or "first of a kind" projects (see Merrow et 
*This work was performed by the Arroyo Center of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, which conducts research for the United States Army through 
agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Arroyo Center JPL, NASA or the 
U. S. Army. We would like to thank Kenneth Arrow, Dave Grether, Linda 
Cohen, Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. Earlier work on this topic was funded by a 
grant from Exxon at the Environmental Quality Laboratory at Caltech. 
al. (1979, 1981) , Montgomery and Quirk (1978) , and Quirk and Terasawa 
(1982) ) .  What pioneer projects have in common with many defense 
contracts is that there is a high degree of uncertainty as to the 
technological and economic parameters of the projects. Under such 
circumstances. it is understandable that cost estimates for such 
projects would be unreliable, but it remains to explain why the cost 
estimates are not only unreliable, but are also biased in a downward 
direction. 
The approach adopted in this paper is to abstract from the 
principal-agent problems that can induce cost underestimates, and 
instead to examine the methodology of cost estimation itself as a 
possible source of the observed cost underestimation bias. What is 
argued here is that a truly unbiased cost estimation procedure would 
generate data consistent with an observed cost underestimation bias. 
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This arises because cost estimates are not only estimates of the costs 
of completed projects, but are also used by decision makers involved 
in the planning and overseeing of a project. A selection bias is 
introduced into comparisons between observed cost estimates and 
observed final costs of projects, because certain projects are 
rejected or abandoned on the basis of cost estimates. Under a 
monotonicity condition, we show that this selection bias leads to a 
"winner's curse" phenomenon of observed cost underestimation bias 
independent of any principal-agent problems. A strengthening of the 
monotonicity condition leads to the conclusion that the observed 
underestimation bias increases with the riskiness of the project, 
again assuming an unbiased estimation procedure. 
Moreover, it is difficult to construct a truly unbiased cost 
estimation methodology, and the methodologies presently in use suffer 
from problems of biasedness and lack of reliability stemming from 
uncertainty, the lack of an adequate data base, asymmetric 
information, and other factors. In particular, the presence of 
uncertainty can lead to a cost underestimation bias even in budget 
cost estimates, generally regarded as the most reliable of the cost 
estimates on a proj ect. In the next section we give a brief
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description of the three basic approaches to cost estimation, and then 
we present some empirical evidence on the cost underestimation problem 
in pioneer projects, before looking at methodological problems in cost 
estimation. 
2. Cost Estimation Methodologies* 
The three types of cost estimation procedures in common use 
are estimation by analogy, parametric estimation, and bottoms up 
estimation. In the early stages of development of a project. when 
detailed project characteristics are still unspecified, and no 
comprehensive task flow charts or project blueprints are available, 
cost estimates (known as initial or preliminary cost estimates) are 
typically based on estimation by analogy or parametric estimation. In 
the latter stages of development, when project definition is completed 
and process and engineering flow charts and construction schedules are 
*See Cost Guide, U.S. Department of Energy, January, 1982, Volumes 1-
6, DOE/MA-0063. 
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available, cost estimates (known as budget or definitive cost 
estimates) are typically based on bottoms up estimation. 
Costing by analogy uses the observed costs of similar projects 
as the basis for estimating the cost of a proposed project. It is the 
most commonly used method of estimating costs. Costing by analogy is 
basically a judgment process, with the accuracy of the estimate 
dependent in large part on the appropriateness of the analogies chosen 
by the cost estimator. If the estimate is for a second coal fired 
plant of an identical design to a first plant built at the same site, 
costing by analogy presumably would provide quite accurate 
information. If the estimate is for a pioneer project that involves a 
significant advance in the state of technology, then it becomes 
difficult to identify analogous projects and estimate errors can be 
quite large. 
An alternative estimation approach often used in the early 
stages of development of a project is parametric estimation. In 
parametric estimation, "the cost of something is based upon the 
relationship of certain physical and performance characteristics to 
cost" (Cost Guide, op. cit. , p. 14). As in costing by analogy, 
parametric cost estimates are based on historical experience, but a 
larger data base is used, and an explicit attempt is made to measure 
the quantitative impacts on cost of various "cost drivers" present in 
a project. The usual procedure is to first identify the physical and 
performance characteristics of a project that are likely to be 
important cost drivers, after which data on these cost drivers are 
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collected from previously completed projects. Least squares curve 
fitting techniques are applied to determine the appropriate functional 
form linking cost to the characteristics of a project. The procedure 
is ad hoc and lacks a coherent theoretical structure, being based on 
the rule--that which fits best, predicts best. Problems of lack of 
reliability and biasedness are most pronounced when the cost estimate 
is for a pioneer project. 
In contrast to costing by analogy and parametric estimation, 
bottoms up cost estimates are prepared far enough into development of 
a project so that project specific data can be used in the estimates. 
Labor, material, and equipment requirements are determined from the 
project task flow sheets and blueprints, with the unit costs of these 
requirements being estimated from current price lists and the records 
of past projects, and perhaps even from firm price quotes for major 
equipment items. Given a well defined project with a firm 
construction schedule, the bottoms up cost estimate can achieve a high 
degree of accuracy. However, if the design, schedule, or mix of 
equipment changes, this invalidates the assumptions underlying the 
bottoms up estimate, and can lead to substantial estimation errors. 
3. Cost Estimation Bias: Some Empirical Results
Anecdotal accounts of cost overruns on major construction 
projects abound. Mead, et al. [19771 report that the New Orleans 
Superdome had an initial cost estimate in 1967 of $46 million, and was 
completed in 1975 at a final cost of $175 million. The Bay area's 
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subway system BART had an estimated cost of $996 million in 1962 and a 
final cost of $1.64 billion in 1976. The Alaskan pipeline was 
something of a record holder in cost overruns until the recent 
experience with nuclear power plants; the pipeline had an estimated 
cost of $900 million in 1970 and came in at a whopping $7. 7 billion in 
1977. 
In the case of nuclear power, cost overruns of ten times or 
more of the original estimate are now not uncommon. For example, San 
Onofre units 2 and 3 were ordered in 1970 with estimated capital costs 
of $187/KW. These units are now (1984) coming on line with costs 
reportedly in the over $2000/KW range. During the early 1970s, the 
AEC (later NRC) published quarterly data on updated cost estimates for 
all nuclear units under order. This was dropped after 1976, 
presumably in part at least because of the alarming rate of cost 
escalation the estimates were showing. Table 1 summarizes the pattern 
exhibited by the updated cost estimates. 
While nuclear capital cost escalation is perhaps the best 
known instance of cost underestimation bias, in fact the phenomenon is 
quite widespread, as is indicated by Table 2 .  One of the rare 
exceptions to the cost underestimation bias phenomenon is the case of 
Corps of Engineers estimates prepared for projects under consideration 
for Congressional approval. Merrow, e.t al [1979] report that the 
ratio of actual to estimated cost for all Corps projects (1954-65) was 
. 998. This lack of bias was combined with a high degree of lack of 
reliability, however. We will return to this example below. 
6a 
TABLE 1 
AVERAGE ESTIMATED FINAL COST, $/kw, AT SELECTED POINTS IN TIME, 
FOR NUCLEAR UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, 196S-197S 
NSSS Average Estimated Final f.Q.il §_lg.!!. of: 
�� !/67 !/68 !/69 1/70 !Ill. 1111. !Ill !/7S !i/76 
196 S-Turnkey 137 133 131 129 143 lSS 226 
Other 123 138 148 170 21S 257 279 694 
1966-Turnkey 126 12S 126 117 131 129 157 
Other 122 129 141 160 188 213 277 328 429 
1967 - 148 148 171 194 237 319 448 S39 
1968 - - 1S6 193 206 2S2 3S9 460 S78 
1969 - - - 208 228 328 37S S71 701 
1970 - - - - 217 248 301 402 501 
1971 - - - - - 301 370 521 S91 
1972 - - - - - - 420 S41 722 
1973 - - - - - - - S83 678 
1974 - - - - - - - S49 690 
1975 - - - - - - - - 694 
Source: Central Plants, AEC and ERDA, selected issues, 1967-1976. 
See Montgomery and Quirk [1978), p. 24. 
(The turnkey plants shown for 196S and 1966 were plants built under 
fixed price contracts). 
TABLE 2 
SU�fl-IARY OF COST ESTIMATING EXPERIENCE 
Items Estimated 
Weapons, 19SOs 
Weapons, 1960s 
Public works 
Highway 
Water projects 
Building 
Ad hoc 
Najor construction 
Energy process plants 
N = number of projects 
Mean of Actual to 
Estimated Cost 
1.89 
1.40 
1.26 
1.39 
1.63 
2.14 
2 .18 
2.S3 
N 
SS 
2S 
49 
49 
S9 
lS 
12 
10 
6b 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.36 
.39 
.63 
.70 
.83 
1.36 
l.S9 
.Sla 
alt is unknown how the standard deviation is affected by using the 
ratio of the last available estimate to the first available estimate 
instead of actual to originally estimated costs. 
Source: Merrow, et al. [1979), p. 73, 
7 
The pervasiveness of cost underestimation bias led to the RAND 
studies by Merrow, et al. [1979, 1981], to isolate the factors that 
appeared to be associated with such cost overruns, in order to apply 
an appropriate correction to the observed cost estimates. The 
approach we adopt is quite different; instead of using curve fitting 
devices to obtain correction equations, we are concerned with the 
conceptual issues associated with the existence of an observed cost 
estimation bias. The next section examines the "winner's curse" 
phenomenon in cost estimation bias. 
4. Observed and True Cost Estimation Bias 
The data shown in Tables 1 and 2 represent instances of cost 
overruns in the usual sense of the term, that is, the costs of 
completed projects exceeded cost estimates for the projects. Do these 
data imply the existence of an estimation bias in the cost estimation 
methodology? A distinction can be drawn between two kinds of cost 
estimation bias. There is an observed estimation bias when there is a 
systematic difference on average between observed cost estimates and 
the realized costs of completed projects; for example, as in the 
previous section, when observed cost estimates are less on average 
than the cost of completed projects. 
A true cost estimation bias exists when there is a systematic 
difference on average between cost estimates for prospective projects 
and the costs of those prospective projects if they were to be carried 
forward to completion. Thus there would be a true cost 
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underestimation bias if cost estimates on average were less than the 
expected value of costs of these projects, if they were carried 
forward to completion. The hypothetical nature of the comparison 
involved in a true estimation bias means that such a bias is never 
actually observed, whether by the estimator, his client, or an outside 
observer, since data are missing on projects that were not initiated 
or were not carried forward to completion. 
Suppose that the methodology of cost estimation were such that 
estimates free of a true estimation bias could be produced. Leaving 
to one side for the moment how one goes about obtaining such 
estimates, we can still ask the question: "what is the effect in 
terms of observed estimation bias if cost estimates free of true 
estimation bias are used in the actual decision making on a project?" 
Consider the following simplified situation. A cost estimator 
produces a cost estimate for a project (a single number) and this is 
used by the decision maker in a once and for all go-no go decision 
with respect to a project. Given that the cost estimate is free of a 
true estimation bias, how will the initial cost estimate compare on 
average with the cost of the finished project? We will argue that in 
this situation, an observed cost underestimation bias might well 
occur. This is a variant of the "winner's curse" phenomenon. The 
decision maker chooses projects to initiate on the basis of their 
prospective profitability. Prospective profitability is enhanced by 
low cost estimates (given that the estimates are free of true 
estimation bias), hence projects for which costs are underestimated 
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are more likely to be in the pool of projects that pass the go-no go 
test and thus are initiated, than are projects for which costs are 
overestimated. Hence, on average, the realized costs of completed 
projects will exceed cost estimates for the same projects, and an 
observed cost underestimation bias emerges. 
Formally, let C denote the cost of a project carried forward 
to completion, and let e denote the expected value of C. The true 
value of e is given by e = e, but from the point of view of the 
decision maker, both C and e are random variables. Let x denote a 
cost estimate, that is, an estimator of e. Let g0(e) denote the prior 
pdf over e, and let f (x,0) denote the joint pdf over x,e. If g1Ce
lx> 
is the posterior over e given x, then by Bayes Rule we have 
g1<0
lx> 
f(x,9) g0Ce> 
( 1) f�f(x, 9>g0C9) de 
Let n denote the profits from a project, where n = n (C) . 
n = R - C. We assume that R is independent of C so that n(C)
is a linear decreasing function of C. 1 Let U be the utility function 
of the project manager, assumed to be monotone increasing and strictly 
concave in n. Let EU denote the opportunity cost of a project, that 
is. the best alternative use of resources devoted to the project, 
measured in expected utility terms. After observing x, the expected 
utility from initiating and completing the project is given by 
EUCClx> = J�J�u(n (C) ) f(C,9) gl(elx) dCde ( 2) 
where f is the joint density of C,9. Under a simple myopic one shot 
decision process, a project is initiated if EU (Clx> l EU, and is 
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rejected otherwise. 
To analyze the implications of such a rule, we introduce a 
monotonicity condition (•) : 
(•) Let GCelx> = J�g1Ctlx>dt and let FCC le> = Jgf(t,e) dt. 
Then G e aG�elx> � o for all x. and < o for some x, x x 
and F0 e 
aF��le> � O for all e, and < o for some e. 
Condition (*) asserts that observing a larger value of x, an 
unbiased estimator of e, leads to a posterior distribution over e that 
dominates the distribution associated with a lower value of x (in the 
sense of first degree stochastic dominance) , and similarly for the 
distribution f with respect to 9. In particular, (*) is satisfied if 
G and F are normal distributions. 2 
We are now in a position to prove the following. 
Proposition 1. Under the monotonicity condition (•) , an observed cost 
underestimation bias is present when the cost estimate x is free of 
true cost estimation bias. 
Proof 
Consider EU (Clx> = J�� U((n(C) ) f(C,9) g1Celx) d9dC. Let
VCClx) = f�g1Celx>FCCle)de. Integrating by parts, we have
av 
ax 
vcclx> = GCelx>FCcle> j� - �G<elx>F9<cle>de
Differentiating with respect to x we have 
J�Gx<elx) F9Ccle>de < O. Thus an increase in x leads to a pdf
over C that stochastically dominates the original distribution (in the 
sense of first degree stochastic dominance). Because U is monotone 
decreasing in C, it follows that aEU�� (x) ( O. 
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Thus the myopic one shot rule "initiate a project if EU 2. EU" 
* can be stated as: "initiate a project if x i x and reject a project
if x > x*,,. where x* satisfies EU(Clx*> = EU .  The expected value of
the cost estimate on projects actually initiated is then given by 
. - . 
fX - !fCx 9) * - fX -Jo xh(x,0)dx, where h(x,9) = ; _ • with <il(x ,9) = Jo 'f'<x,9)dx.
c(>(x ,9) 
The expected value of cost for completed projects is given by 0 since 
the cost estimate is free of true estimation bias. Moreover, we have 
*
9 = �xf(x,S)dx > � xh(x,G)dx. The last inequality follows from the
* a ex - * fact that --;{Jo xh(x,9)dx} > O for x less than the upper support
ax 
for h(x). Hence an observed cost underestimation bias is present. 
For an important subclass of the distributions satisfying the 
monotonicity condition (*), the "winner's curse" phenomenon is more 
pronounced the more uncertainty there is about C and/or 9 as 
Proposition 2 makes clear. 
Proposition 2 .  Under the monotonicity condition (*), and given 
F09 2 O for all 9, (with strict inequality for some 9), a mean 
preserving increase in the spread of G<elx> leads to an increase in 
the observed cost underestimation bias, when the cost estimator x is 
free of true estimation bias. 
Proof: Following Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970], a mean preserving 
increase in the spread of G(0(x) is a distribution G'(0(x) that is 
dominated by G(0(x) in the sense of second degree stochastic 
dominance, that is. f� G(t(x)dt i f�G'(t(x)dt for all 9 with strict
f � I inequality for some 9. Let v•cclx> = 0 g1(0(x)F(C(0)d0 while
V(C(0) = f� g1(0)F(C(0)d0. Integrating by parts, we have
s:; V(t(0)dt - rc; V'(t(0)dt = (-) fg �[G(0(x) - G'(0(x)]Fe<tl9)d0dt.
Integrating again by parts we obtain 
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J":; V(t(9)dt - fc; V'(t(0)dt = � � lf�[G(s(x) - G'(s(x)]dsJF99<tl0)d0dt i O.
Thus V(C(x) stochastically dominates V'(C(x) in the sense of second 
degree stochastic dominance. Hence, with U strictly convex and 
monotone decreasing in C, we have 
Evu<clx> > Ev,u<clx>
Since Ev,U<Clx> is monotone decreasing in x, this implies that
** 
•• 
* *the cutoff value of x under V', x • is such that x < x ,  where x 
is the cutoff value of x under V. Hence on average, projects 
initiated under V' will have lower cost estimates than under V, while 
the expected value of cost for completed projects is 9 under either V' 
or V. Thus the observed cost estimation bias is larger under V' than 
under v.3 
One interpretation of Proposition 2 is that under the 
conditions specified, observed cost underestimation bias will be more 
pronounced the more uncertainty there is about the technological and 
economic parameters of a project, so that pioneer projects in 
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particular should show larger cost underestimates than more 
conventional projects. This is the case where the prior distribution 
g0 is more spread out. A second interpretation of the Proposition
relates to the quality of the estimate itself, that is, to the 
properties of the joint density f(x,9). When a cost estimate is 
prepared as a parametric estimate or an estimate by analogy, 
presumably the decision maker has less confidence in the reliability 
of the estimate than he does with a bottoms up estimate prepared using 
project specific characteristics and data. Thus we would expect to 
find a larger cost underestimation bias with respect to preliminary 
cost estimates than with respect to budget cost estimates, assuming 
that the cost estimation procedures in both cases are free of true 
estimation bias. This helps to account for the persistent upward 
drift in cost estimates over time that characterizes the history of 
nuclear power plants and other pioneer projects as evidenced by the 
data in section 3. 
Given this analysis, how does one account for the absence of a 
cost underestimation bias in post-war Corps of Engineers projects? 
One possible explanation is that the cost estimation methodology of 
the Corps is unbiased (no true estimation bias), but projects that are 
chosen for construction are not chosen on the basis of a ranking of 
(estimated) benefit-cost ratios. Instead, suppose that projects are 
chosen on the basis of their Congressional district location, which is 
uncorrelated with cost (or benefit) estimates. This would effectively 
lead to a random sample of projects under construction, and hence to 
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an absence of selection bias and consequently an absence of observed 
estimation bias. 
5. An Example
To illustrate Propositions 1 and 2, consider the following 
example. Let the utility function of the client decision maker, u(n) 
be written as u(n) = - e-pn, where p is the (constant) coefficient of
absolute risk aversion. The posterior pdf g1<elx> is uniform, being
. I 1 <a + b> written as g1(e x) = b _ a' a + y i e i b + y, where y = x - 2 
Similarly, write f(C,9) as 
1 f(C,9) = fl - a' a + & i C i fl + &. where &
Hence E(&lx) = x, and EC = 9. 
(B + a) 0 - 2 
Then EU(Clx> = 1 • 1 fb+y rfl+&(- e-pn)dCd0(b - a) (fl - a) a+y J a+& 
Since n = R - C, where revenue R is taken as a constant 
independent of C and e, by integration we have 
EU(Clx) p
b (-)e .- - epa 
b - a 
ePfl _ epa 
fl - a 
e-pR 
p2
1 
ep(fl+a)/2 
1 
ep(b+a)/Z 
• ePX 
- ( - *> • • Let EU = (-) e P R C where C is some fixed cost level, 0 < C < R. 
• 
The decision rule is to initiate any project with x i x : where 
EU(Clx*)
• 
EU. Thus x satisfies 
x· =cc* + (IL±...J!.) + (b + a)] + l1n{ (B - a)(b - &--} Z 2 p p2(ePfl _ ePa)(epb _ ePa) 
• 
Suppose fl = 1, a = 0, b = 1, a = 0, p = 1, and C = . 7. Then
x* - . 621. If f(x.9) is uniform on [0 - }. 9 + }l while g0(0) is 
uniform on [.S,1.S] with the true value of e, e = 1/2, then the 
• 
average cost estimate for projects initiated (x � x ) is . 310, while 
the expected cost of a completed project = e = .S. Hence in this 
lS 
example, on average, projects will exhibit a final cost approximately 
60 percent larger than the original cost estimate, even though the 
cost estimate is free of true estimation bias. 
6. Estimation Bias in Bottoms Up Estimation
The ad hoc nature of estimation by analogy and parametric 
estimation makes it difficult to identify the extent of true 
estimation bias in such procedures, except that there are obvious 
problems in selecting the appropriate analogies, especially given that 
the data set is restricted to completed projects. Turning to bottoms 
up estimation, consider the following simplified model of a 
construction project. In this model, the project consists of, say, n 
sequential tasks, the 1th of which must be completed before the
i + 1st is begun. There is a single aggregated input Li that is used
to complete task i. Given the blueprint design, this implicitly 
defines a production fUnction F(i)(OiLi) that specifies the rate at
which task i is being completed, where ei is now interpreted as a
productivity parameter, constant over task i. The larger is ei, the
more effective is the input Li in completing task i. F
(i) is taken to
be monotone increasing in &iLi and strictly concave as well.
In planning the construction project, choices are the task 
completion times ti' i = 1, • • • •  n, and the input usage rates 
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Li(t), i = 1, • • •  ,n. Let Xi(t) denote the fraction of task i that has
been completed by time t. By the sequential nature of task 
scheduling, it follows that x1ct1_1> = O and x1ct1) = 1, while
(1) x1(t) = F (OiLi), t a (ti_1,t1) (3) 
Let w1Ct) denote the cost per unit of input Li(t), and let
r(t) denote the interest rate at time t. We assume that construction 
commences at time t0. Let C denote the present value of cost of the
project, discounted to time t0• Then C is given by
n t1 -r(t)[t - t0J C = � ft Wi(t)Li(t)e dti=l i-1 
The cost estimator is to prepare a point estimate of EC. 
In what follows, to keep the notation as simple as possible 
and to reduce the algebra, we will deal with the special case of a 
( 4) 
two-task project (n = 2), in which r(t) = r, a constant independent of 
t. 
We assume that r and the time paths {wi(t)} are known with
certainty by the cost estimator so that the only uncertainty in the 
model relates to the productivity parameters ei. e1 is assumed to be
known with certainty at the time the cost estimate is prepared, but &2
is unknown. The cost estimator has a probability density function 
gC02) over e2• We examine two bottoms up cost estimation procedures
for estimating project cost at t0: (1) the cost estimator uses as his
estimate of e2 a point estimate that has the probability distribution
g(e2); and (2), the cost estimator prepares an estimate of expected
cost, assuming that when task 1 is completed, the parameter 02 is 
observed, following which task 2 is completed in a cost minimizing 
way. Estimate (1) will be referred to as a naive cost estimate, 
denoted by CN; while estimate (2) will be referred to as a
sophisticated cost estimate to be denoted by Cs. 
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The naive cost estimate CN is obtained by solving the problem
2 t -r(t - t ) 
min C = )" Jti wi(t)Li(t)e O dt�l i-1 
subject to Xi(t) = FCi> ceiLi) i = 1,2
with Xi(ti_1) =O, Xi(ti) =1, i=l.2; and
subject to t2 i TCe2> .
( 5) 
Under the naive cost estimating procedure, the cost estimator 
solves for the cost-minimizing trajectories L1(t), L2Ct), and the task
completion times t1, t2 treating 02 as known with certainty. The
project completion time T<e2> is assumed to be the DPV maximizing
choice of T by an expected profit maximizing client. Under the naive 
cost estimation procedure, the cost estimator in effect observes a 
random variable drawn from the distribution g(62) and treats the value
observed as the value 02 will take on, with certainty, during task 2.
The sophisticated estimate CS is solved for using the usual
dynamic programming algorithm. At time 1, when 02 is known by the
project decision maker, it is assumed that L2ct2> . t2 are chosen to
solve the problem 
t -r(t - t ) 
min ft
2 w2(t)L2(t)e
O dt
1 • (2) subject to x2Ct) = F <e2L2> .
with x2ct1) = O, x2ct2> = 1; and subject to
t2 i TCe2>
Here again TCe2> is the terminal time for the project as
chosen by an expected profit maximizing project manager. Let 
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( 6) 
c2ce2,t1> denote the constrained minimum of discounted cost obtained
by solving (6). This is the incremental discounted cost required to 
complete the project. Reverting to time t0, the cost estimator
chooses L1(t) and t1 to solve the problem
subject 
t -r(t -
min ft1 w1(t)L1(t)e0 • ( 1) to Xl(t) = F <e1L1> ·
to>
X1Ct0) = 0, x1<t1) = 1,
dt + EgC2Ce2,t1>
( 7) 
where Egc2c02,t1> indicates that the expectation is taken over the pdf
g<e2> ·
Solving (5) for CN, and solving (6) and (7) for CS involves
the usual Euler-Lagrange first order conditions along with 
transversality conditions. We will not need these conditions in what 
follows, however. Instead we are interested in the issue of potential 
cost estimation bias from the use of these estimators. In that 
regard, the following result holds. 
Proposition 3. Let E CN denote the expected value of the naive costg 
estimator, under the pdf gC02). Then EgCN i Cs.
Proof E CN -- g 
Eg min {C1CL1,t1) + c2CL2,t1,t2,92)}, while C
S
Ll • L2 • tl ' t2
min {C1CL1,t1> + Eg min c2CL2.t1.t2,92)}, where Ll,tl L2,t2 
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f
t1 -r(t - t0> f
t2 -r(t - t0)C1 = t w1Ct)L1(t)e dt, c2 = t w2(t)L2(t)e dt. 0 1 
Thus EgC
N i Cs, because CN in effect assumes that 02 is known at t0,
before L1 and t1 are chosen, while C
S takes into account the fact that
L1 and t1 must be chosen before 02 is observed.
Proposition 3 reflects the simple fact that information is 
valuable when it is relevant to decision making, and the naive 
estimate does not incorporate the cost arising from uncertainty at 
time t0 as to what value the productivity parameter a2 will take on
during the second task. Hence the naive estimate underestimates cost 
on average relative to the sophisticated estimate. 
Clearly, the sophisticated cost estimate is the one that would 
be employed by an expected discounted profit maximizing project 
manager, assuming away the transactions costs involved in actually 
solving the dynamic programming problem for all possible scenarios. 
The use of the naive cost estimator produces a downward biased cost 
estimate relative to the idealized sophisticated cost estimate. Hence 
bottoms up cost estimates involve a true estimation bias, because the 
costs associated with uncertainty are not fully reflected in the 
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estimates. There is an implicit recognition of this underestimation 
bias in the widespread use of contingency allowances in bottoms up 
estimation, and the above analysis provides at least an elementary 
examination of factors that are of interest in determining the size of 
such contingency allowances. Once again, however, note that 
uncertainty (lack of reliability) leads to an underestimation bias--
lack of reliability and underestimation bias are correlates. 
Since a part of the true cost underestimation bias in bottoms 
up estimating is directly related to the value of information, it is 
of interest to determine when it is true that an increase in 
uncertainty leads to an increase in the value of information, and 
hence an increase in true estimation bias. Results in this vein, 
however, tend to be ambiguous. Sufficient conditions for an increase 
in uncertainty to increase the value of information can be derived by 
extending an earlier result due to Hess [1982]. Consider a two period 
dynamic programming problem of the form: 
max{f(x) + E9 max h(x,y,9)}.x y 
Let W denote the value of information, so that W can be written as 
w f max [f(x) + h(x,y,9)]g(0)d0 - max{f(x) + 
x,y x 
f max h(x,y,9)g(9)d0} 
y 
Let x(0),y(0) denote the maximizers of the first term, and let 
• • • x ,y (x ,9) denote the maximizers of the second term. Then we have 
f 
• • • 
W = {[f(x(0)) + h(x(0),y(0),9)] - [f(x ) + h(x ,y ,9)])g(6)d6 
Let v(0) = v1(6) - v2(6), where
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v1(e) = f(x(e)) + h(x(e),y(e),9) and v2(e) = f(x*> + h(x*,y*,9).
Then, by the "principle of increasing risk" (see Rothschild and
Stiglitz [1970]), W increases when there is a mean preserving increase 
in the spread of g if v99 > o. 
v! = fxx9 + hxxe + �y9 + h9, with
1 2 ve& = (hxx + fxx> xe + (fx + hx> xee + 2hxyX9Y9 + 2hxexe + 2hyeY9 + hee + hyYee
2 
+ hyyYe 
By the first order conditions, fx + hx = O and hy = O.
We also have f xe + h xe + h Ye = - h h andxx xx xy Xv 
hyxxe + hyyYe = - hye
It follows that v!e reduces to
1 vee 
where xe 
Ye 
= hxexe + hyeYe + hee 
hxyhye - hyyhxe 
A 
hxyhxe - (fxx + hxx> hye 
A 
with A = (fxx + hxx> hyy - h!y• 
f + h h h 
• xx xx xy xe 
Hence v!e = �· where t..* = I hyx hyy �e - I'"' + ...... ,and A - h h xy YY 
2 • • • ve = hyYe + he 
. hxe hye hee 
2 • • • • • • • 2vee = hyY&e + 2hyeYe + hee + hyy<Ye>
• • By the first order condition hy = O while Ye
h
.
� 
• • 
h yy
2 • • • 2 • It follows that vee = (heehyy - hye> l /hyy" 
Then we have established the following result. 
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Proposition 4.  In the problem max {f(x) + Ee max h(x,y,9)} assume that 
x y 
• • • 2 • h is jointly concave in x and y, with h9ehyy - (hy9> 2 O and A 2 O 
(at least one inequality strict). Then a mean preserving increase in 
the spread of the pdf g(e) increases the value of information. 
Even under simplified conditions, application of Proposition 4 
to the model of construction of this paper does not generate much in 
the way of straightforward results. In one highly special case, with 
wt = w0e
rt so that L1 and L2 are constants over tasks 1 and 2, and
with the terminal time T independent of &2, then if the production
function is of the Cobb-Douglas variety, F = (eL)a, t < a < 1 implies
that an increase in uncertainty increases the value of information. 
In this special case, an increase in uncertainty (of the Rothschild-
Stiglitz variety) leads to an increase in the true estimation bias of 
bottoms up estimators. In the general case, the links between 
uncertainty and true estimation bias will depend on the functional 
forms characterizing the model. 
7. Summary • 
The objective in this paper has been to shed some light on the 
phenomenon of observed cost underestimation bias in contracting, both 
in defense procurement and in private contracting. What we have shown 
is that even if cost estimating procedures were unbiased, the use of 
cost estimates in go-no go project decisions making induces an 
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observed cost underestimation bias. one that is larger the more 
uncertainty there is about the cost parameters of a project, given the 
conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 .  Moreover, the bottoms up cost 
estimation approach as applied in practice produces estimates with 
true cost underestimation bias, because the costs of uncertainty are 
not incorporated into the estimate except in the form of contingency 
allowances. The relationship between increased uncertainty and true 
estimation bias is somewhat obscure, because uncertainty and the value 
of information are related in a somewhat obscure and non-intuitive 
fashion. In summary, a part at least of the observed cost 
underestimation bias in defense contracting and pioneer projects is 
due to the use of cost estimates in project decision making and an 
under-accounting for uncertainty in bottoms up estimates. An 
important empirical question is to determine the importance of cost 
underestimation bias arising from these factors, relative to the cost 
overruns representing efficiency losses due to moral hazard problems 
associated with asymmetric information and the presence of market 
power. These issues remain to be explored. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Clearly there are cases in which R might depend on C, for example 
in defense contracting if the renegotiation process under annual 
contracting leads to higher unit prices on succeeding contracts 
in response to higher current costs. We exclude such cases here 
because we are interested in identifying sources of cost 
underestimation bias even when the moral hazard problems arising 
from principal-agent difficulties are absent. The same comment 
applies to possible Averch-Johnson effects on electric utilities 
engaged in construction of nuclear plants, although here the 
empirical evidence strongly suggests that even if R is an 
increasing function of C, n is a decreasing (but perhaps not 
linear) function of C. See Braeutigam, R. and Quirk, J. [1984]. 
We wish to thank Kevin Sontheimer and Tom Lee for their comments 
on this point. 
2 .  The condition (*) is a sufficient condition for Proposition 1 and 
has a simple intiutive interpretation. The necessary and 
sufficient condition for Proposition 1 is that 
f� J;;Gx<elx> F9<tl9)d9dt i O for all C, < O for some, which is
clearly satisfied by(*). 
3. Note that the condition F99 2 O for all 9 is satisfied for the 
normal case.
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